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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of technology-intensive products and industries is
an important component of American industrial policy, especially in light
of what has been portrayed as the decline of American manufacturing
prowess.' Consistent with this view, the need to revive American indus-
trial "competitiveness" by fostering the development of new technologies
and processes has received considerable attention. 2 This objective is
shared by federal intellectual property law, which encourages innovation
by protecting what is often a substantial investment in the development
of new technologies.3
The creation of a new process or technology is only a starting point,
however. To be useful, the new technology must be commercialized so
that it is workable and profitable in the marketplace. 4 Commercialization
is often accomplished through license agreements in which the owner of
intellectual property retains his ownership in the licensed property, but
allows the licensee to utilize the intellectual property in a manner con-
sistent with the terms contained in a license agreement. A potential
I E.g. C. PREsTown'z, TRADING PLACES-How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE
LEAD (1988); Penner, Is the U.S. Going the Way of Britain?, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr.
20, 1987, at 64; McClenahen, Manufacturing's Mixed Grades, INDUSTRY WEEK,
Jan. 2, 1989, at 14.
2 See, e.g., Sodberg, America's Engineering Gap, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1989, at
A4, col. 3; Keyworth, We may lose the competitiveness race unless we put R&D to
work, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, Jan 23, 1989, at 41, col. 1. See generally G.
ROSSEGER, THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTION AND INNOVATION, AN INDUSTRIAL PER-
SPECTIVE (2d ed. 1986).
1 The sources and objectives of intellectual property protection were recently
summarized by Congress as part of its consideration of the Intellectual Property
Antitrust Act:
Congress enacted the federal intellectual property laws pursuant to
its constitutional power to promote the progress of science and useful
arts. See U.S. CONST. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8. The intellectual property laws
increase social welfare by encouraging investment in innovation. By
recognizing intellectual innovations as property, these laws provide
inventors, as well as authors and other artists, with exclusive rights
to the use of their inventions and original works for a limited time.
These rights enable innovators to capture some of the economic re-
wards of their efforts.
S. REP. No. 492, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
ISee F. BUTTRELL, TECHNOLOGY TO PAYOFF-MANAGING THE NEW PRODUCT
FROM CREATION TO CUSTOMER 3 (1984).
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roadblock to successful commercialization in the context of intellectual
property licensing is the bankruptcy of the licensor, especially where the
licensor elects to reject the license agreement under 11 U.S.C. §365.5
Recent court decisions have been viewed as having a chilling effect on
the licensing process by allowing a bankrupt intellectual property licensor
to reject an executory license agreement, thereby depriving the licensee
of access to the technology which is the subject matter of the agreement.6
In response to these concerns, Congress, in October of 1988, enacted
the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act [the Act]. The Act
is intended to "promote the development and licensing of intellectual
property by providing certainty to licensees in situations where the li-
censor files bankruptcy and seeks to reject the license as an executory
contract ' 7 by providing the licensee an "assurance of being able to con-
tinue to use the licensed intellectual property after rejection, while debt-
ors/licensors will still be able to free themselves of burdensome
obligations." As defined by the Act,9 the term intellectual property en-
compasses trade secrets, inventions, processes, designs, and plants or
plant varieties, including related patents and patent applications. Con-
fidential research and development information, works of authorship, and
mask works are also protected. 10 Trademarks, trade names, and service
marks are deliberately excluded from the definition due to a Congres-
sional determination that further study is required before enacting pro-
visions dealing with these areas.1'
'11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988). Section 365 codifies the circumstances under which
a trustee or debtor in possession is empowered to reject an executory contract as
part of a bankruptcy action.
6 Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 Bankr. 427 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). See also Agres, Bankruptcy Law Loophole Worries New Firms, THE SCI-
ENTIST, Aug. 8, 1988, at 3, col. 2 (discussing impact of the Lubrizol decision on
smaller firms); Fanning, Invisible Property, FORBES, March 23, 1987, at 104 (dis-
cussing potential problems associated with bankruptcy in the context of intel-
lectual property licensing).
An executory contract is generally considered to be one in which performance
is due, to some extent, by both sides. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of executory contracts in the context of intellectual property
licensing, see infra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
7 H.R. REP. No. 1012, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988).
8 Id. The Senate perceived a similar objective in the adoption of the Act. As
stated by the Senate, the purpose of the Act "is to make clear that the rights of
an intellectual property licensee to use the licensed property cannot be unilat-
erally cut off as a result of the rejection of the license ... in the event of the
licensor's bankruptcy." S. REP. No. 505, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988).
9 The Act adds a new subsection to 11 U.S.C. § 101 as follows:
(52) 'intellectual property' means-
(A) trade secret;
(B) invention, process, design, plant, or plant variety, including
patents or patent applications thereon;
(C) confidential research or development information;
(D) work of authorship, including copyrights therefor; or
(E) maskwork; to the extent protected by applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law; and
(53) 'mask work' has the meaning given it in section 901(a)(2) of title
17.
10 11 U.S.C. § 101 (52) & (53) (1988).
" S. REP. No. 505, supra note 8, at 5.
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The Act adds a new subsection to 11 U.S.C. §365 which allows the
licensee of intellectual property under an executory contract to choose
between two options in those situations where the contract is rejected as
part of the licensor's bankruptcy. 2 The licensee's first option is to accept
12 The text of 11 U.S.C. § 365 was amended to include the following:
(n)(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a
licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such contract
may elect-
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such rejection
by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the licensee
to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms, ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee
with another entity; or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity pro-
vision of such contract, but excluding any other right under applicable
nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract) under such
contract and under any agreement supplementary to such contract, to
such intellectual property (including any embodiment of such intel-
lectual property to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy
law), as such rights existed immediately before the case commenced,
for-
(i) the duration of such contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the licensee
as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law
(2) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph (1)(B) of
this subsection, under such contract-
(A) the trustee shall allow the licensee to exercise such rights;
(B) the licensee shall make all payments with respect to such rights due
under such contract with respect to the rights retained for the duration
of such contract and for any period described in paragraph (1)(B) of this
subsection for which the licensee extend such contract; and
(C) he licensee shall have been deemed to waive-
(i) any right to setoff it may have with respect to such contract under this
title or applicable nonbankruptcy law; and
(ii) any claim allowable under section 503(b) of this title arising from the
performance of such contract.
(3) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph (1)(B) of
this subsection, then on the written request of the licensee the trustee shall-
(A) to the extent provided in such contract, or any agreement supplementary
to such contract, provide to the licensee any intellectual property (in-
cluding such embodiment) held by the trustee; and
(B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such contract,
or any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual
property (including such embodiment) including any right to obtain such
intellectual property (or such embodiment) from another entity.
(4) Unless and until the trustee rejects such contract, on the written request of
the licensee the trustee shall-
(A) to the extent provided in such contract or any agreement supplementary
to such contract-
(i) perform such contract; or
(ii) provide to the licensee such intellectual property (including any em-
bodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law) held by the trustee; and
(B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such contract,
or any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual
property (including such embodiment), including any right to obtain such
intellectual property (or such embodiment) from a third entity.
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the rejection as terminating the contract.13 This option was available
before passage of the Act. Secondly, the Act allows the licensee to retain
its intellectual property rights under the contract, including rights to any
embodiments of the property, 4 to the extent that the rights existed im-
mediately prior to commencement of the case. 15 The rights can be retained
for the duration of the contract and for any period which the licensee
could, as of right, extend the contract.'5 If the licensee elects to retain its
contract rights, it is required to make royalty payments as required under
the contract, and waives any right to setoff of damages under the contract
and claims for administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. §503(b).17 The
trustee must allow the licensee continued access to the underlying in-
tellectual property in those cases where the licensee elects to retain its
rights to the property in response to rejection by the trustee.8 The trustee
must also perform in accordance with the terms of the license agreement
during the period prior to rejection. 19
In order to gain a more complete understanding of the Intellectual
Bankruptcy Protection Act and its impact, it is useful to consider the Act
in terms of the background, both legal and commercial, from which it
developed. This background includes the underpinnings of bankruptcy
law, the economic forces which make intellectual property licensing an
attractive method for accomplishing technology transfer, and the case
law which generated an interest in statutory reform.
II. EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY
Modern bankruptcy law can be viewed as a mechanism which is de-
signed to promote two often divergent goals. When considered in the
context of a business bankruptcy, one such goal is to keep firms in op-
eration when it is societally advantageous to do sO. 2° Secondly, bankruptcy
law operates to protect the creditor based on the assumption that the
bankrupt's estate is insufficient to pay each creditor in full. Thus, the
Bankruptcy Code provides for a distribution process which determines
who, among the creditors, should get what, and in what order.2' This
assures an orderly means for the distribution of the bankrupt's estate.
11 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(A) (1988).
14 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (1988). Potential embodiments include, but are not
limited to, prototypes containing the licensed intellectual property, genetic ma-
terial needed to produce certain biotechnological products and computer program
source codes. The licensee is to have access to the embodiment as it existed on
the day of the bankruptcy filing. S. REP. 505, supra note 8, at 10.
15 A bankruptcy case is commenced by filing a petition with the bankruptcy
court. See 11 U.S.C. § 3013 (1978).16 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (1988).
17 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2) (1988).
1 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3) (1988).
19 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(4) (1988).
20 See T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LImrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 2 (1986).
21 Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor's Bar-
gain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 857 (1982).
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The affairs of the estate are administered by a trustee who has a fi-
duciary duty to represent the estate and can sue or be sued for matters
dealing with his duty as trustee.22 In actions for liquidation of the estate
under Chapter 7, "[t]he trustee's principal duty is to collect and reduce
to money the property of the estate for which he serves, and to close up
the estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of
parties in interest. ' 23 In a proceeding for reorganization under Chapter
11, the debtor will usually retain control of his business while the reor-
ganization is under way. A debtor performing in this capacity is referred
to as the debtor in possession.24 The debtor in possession acts in a capacity
very similar to that of a trustee and is, for all intents and purposes,
equivalent to a trustee.25 Thus, the two terms are often used interchange-
ably.
The provisions whereby the trustee can reject or assume executory
contracts are contained in 11 U.S.C. § 365.26 Rejection occurs when, with
the approval of the court, the trustee disaffirms the estate's obligation to
perform under an executory contract. An executory contract is generally
considered to be one in which performance is due, to some extent, by both
sides.27
The power of rejection benefits the estate by relieving the bankrupt of
ongoing duties under an executory contract where disaffirmance would
be advantageous to the bankrupt.2 Rejection constitutes a breach of the
contract immediately preceding the filing of the debtor's petition so as to
treat the other contracting party as a general unsecured credi-
tor.29 Rejection prevents the contracting creditor from obtaining specific
performance as to the executory portions of the contract, limits the cred-
22 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1978).
. S. REP No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The duties of the trustee are
set forth by 11 U.S.C. § 704. Section 704 also provides that the trustee has a duty
to account for all property received, investigate the financial affairs of the debtor,
examine and object to improper claims, oppose the discharge of the debtor, furnish
information to parties in interest, and prepare a final report concerning the ad-
ministration of the estate.
B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, Para. 8.08 (xxxx).
25 The rights, powers, and duties of a debtor in possession are set forth in 11
U.S.C. § 1107 (1978), which provides that "a debtor in possession shall have all
the rights, other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title,
and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties" of a trustee. Section
1107 also provides that the debtor in possession need not perform an investigation
into the affairs of the debtor as is required of a trustee.
16 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1978).
27 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977). Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
460 (1973).
"I Borman's, Inc. v. Allied Supermarkets, 706 F.2d 187, 189 (6th Cir. 1983);
See Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988). COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY Para. 365.08 (15th Ed.
1985). Section 365 also allows the trustee to assume executory contracts, with
the approval of the court, provided that the trustee shows that past non-perfor-
mance has been cured, compensates the other party for earlier defaults, and can
assure future performance. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1978).
1989]
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itor's claim to damages for breach of contract, 0 and is not the equivalent
of rescision.3 1 Rather, rejection constitutes a breach of contract, and the
injured party is treated as a general unsecured creditor and is entitled
to assert a claim for damages caused by the breach.2
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE AGREEMENTS
The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act operates to clarify
the rights of parties to intellectual property license agreements in situ-
ations where the licensor seeks to reject the license agreement. Implicit
in the adoption of the Act is a recognition of the impact of license agree-
ments in facilitating the commercialization of new technology. An un-
derstanding of the inventive and innovative processes as applicable to
intellectual property license agreements will provide a useful background
for evaluating the operation and policy implications of the Act.33
Invention 34 and innovation35 are key factors in the ongoing process of
technological change. For an invention to have further economic impact,
it must be transformed through the innovative process into products that
pass the tests of technical and economic feasibility, and ultimately, mar-
ket acceptance. 36 Congress has recognized that the innovative "process
30 Rudaw/Empirical Software Products Ltd. v. Elgar Electronics Corp., 83
Bankr. 241, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Leasing Services Corp. v. First Tennessee Bank
Nat'l Ass'n, 826 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Executive Technology Data
Sys., 79 Bankr. 276, 282 (E.D.Mich. 1987).
31 Rudaw/Empirical Software Prod. Ltd. v. Elgar Electronics Corp., 83 Bankr.
241, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), Leasing Services Corp. v. First Tennessee Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, 826 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1987); Murphy v. C&W Ltd. Corp., 694 F.2d
172, 174 (8th Cir. 1982); Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 482 (8th
Cir. 1979); In re Executive Technology Data Sys., 79 Bankr. 276, 282 (E.D. Mich.
1987).
12 Murphy, 694 F.2d at 174.
33 See R. ROTHWELL & W. ZEGVELD, REINDUSTRIALIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY 47
(1985).
1 Invention is a term of art which describes the observation or discovery of
new scientific principles which expand the scope of knowledge or open new areas
for scientific inquiry. B. MAJUMDAR, INNOVATIONS, PRODUCT DEVELOPMENTS, AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 35 (1982). See also C. FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF IN-
DUSTRIAL INNOVATION 7 (2d ed. 1982); R. ROTHWELL & W. ZEGVELD, supra note
33, at 7.
35 Innovation is a term of art used to describe process which transforms the
principles underlying an invention into a useful product or services. B. MAJUMDAR,
supra note 34, at 35. See also C. FREEMAN, supra note 34, at 7; R. ROTHWELL &
W. ZEGVELD, supra note 33, at 47. The scope of technological change encompassed
by innovations varies significantly. Innovations can be classified as radical in-
novations which change or create whole industries, systems innovations (such as
communications networks) which take many years and millions of dollars to
accomplish, and incremental innovations, which are small but important im-
provements to products, processes, or services. F. BETZ, MANAGING TECHNOLOGY,
COMPETING THROUGH NEW VENTURES, INNOVATION, AND CORPORATE RESEARCH 7
(1987).
36 G. ROSEGGER, supra note 2, at 109; C. FREEMAN supra note 34, at 7.
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begins with an inventive concept and must proceed through an expensive
and risky series of steps including research, development, manufacturing,
and marketing. At each step, both money and additional refinement of
the idea are required.."37 This process and its attendant costs are well
documented:
R&D [Research and Development] projects move toward com-
mercialization through several roughly defined stages: a pre-
laboratory phase, laboratory work (to garner scientific and
engineering knowledge), engineering (to seek a basis for eco-
nomic evaluation), pilot plant or prototype (to refine and prove
the economic evaluation), and full scale production. Each stage
of the commercialization process is much more costly than the
one preceding it-as a rule of thumb, four or five times more
costly. Thus, if laboratory work costs $1 million, engineering
may cost $5 million, a pilot plant perhaps $20 million, and
production facilities $100 million.3 8
In light of the extensive investment, in both time and money, which is
required to launch a new product, the attributes of the product itself must
be carefully considered. The product must meet the needs of the mar-
ketplace in terms of its function, price, quantity, location, timing, and
presentation. 39 Furthermore, the financing, expertise, and additional
product refinements necessary to meet these needs are often only avail-
able through the participation of persons other than the original inven-
tor.40 For example, an inventor may lack the resources or the expertise
to manufacture a new product so as to meet anticipated demand in a cost
effective manner. An enterprise with manufacturing expertise, on the
other hand, may be unable to develop a desired new product within the
period of time necessary to meet an expected market window. At the same
time, a warehouse filled with completed products represents a significant
loss if it is not made available to potential customers through appropriate
marketing and distribution channels.
.3 S. REP. No. 505, supra note 8, at 3. The path from invention to social appli-
cation is often long and hazardous. C. FREEMAN, supra note 34, at 7.38 Lee, Fisher, & Yau, Getting Things Done-Is Your R&D on Track?, HARV.
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 35-36. The pharmaceuticals industry provides an
excellent example of a research intensive industry. The Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturers Association estimates the cost of bringing a new drug to market to be
over $100 million. This investment begins when testing commences and continues
until the Food and Drug Administration grants approval for marketing. J.
McLaughlin, Vice President Governmental Affairs, Genentech, Inc., Statement
Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate on S. 1626, at 2 (June 10, 1988). The bio-
technology industry provides an excellent example of the risk associated with
these high development expenditures. In 1988, at least 24 biotechnology com-
panies filed for bankruptcy protection. Biotechnology executives also believe that
within 10 years roughly half of the 500 U.S. companies in the biotechnology
business will fail, merge, or enter into a cost sharing agreement. This problem
is due, in large part, to the fact that these businesses cannot raise the necessary
capital or develop a marketable product. Naj, Clouds Gather Over the Biotech
Industry, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1989, at B1, col. 3.
39 F. BUTTRELL, supra note 4, at 13.
0 S. REP No. 505, supra note 8, at 3.
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The element of risk plays a significant role in an organization's decision
concerning the innovative process, especially as applied to the develop-
ment of new technology. 41 Of all the areas to which resources can be
allocated, research and development investments have the longest time
frame, the least certain outcome, and face the least well-defined compet-
itive environment. 42 Although R&D expenditures are subtracted from
current earnings, the rewards, if they materialize at all, will contribute
only to earnings realized in the distant future.4a Thus, the generation of
major technological advances often ranks quite low compared to other
means for the achievement of an organization's business goals, because
it involves heavy investment and high risks, not only for the firm, but
also the for the personal careers of the decision makers. 44 Although tech-
nological progress is one of the hallmarks of a healthy economy, risk
aversion makes competitive pressures and external events, rather than
an inherent organizational proclivity for innovation, more likely stimuli
for major innovative efforts. 45
The development of a new product or service presents its own set of
risks, especially due to uncertainty as to whether technical and market
goals will be achieved.46 A major uncertainty in most R&D investments
is whether the research phase will produce a viable product. 47 Not only
must the product work, 4 it must compete successfully with other products.
In order to do so effectively, the product must possess the attributes
necessary for successful market entry.49 The absence of any one of these
attributes can spell failure for the new product and result in the loss of
resources already invested in the project as well as the potential gains
realized by a successful product introduction. The extensive risks are
highlighted by a classic study by the market research firm of Booz, Allen,
and Hamilton which found that in fifty-one major U.S. companies only
two percent (2%) of new products were commercially successful, with
almost ninety percent (90%) failing prior to market testing.50
41 See G. ROSSEGER, supra note 2, at 170.
42 Lee, Fisher, & Yau, supra note 38, at 34.
4Id. at 34.
4G. ROSEGGER, supra note 2, at 170.
15 Id. at 171.
See Lee, Fisher, & Yau, supra note 38, at 35.
47 Hodder & Riggs, Pitfalls in Evaluating Risky Projects, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan-Feb 1985 at 134. In the pharmaceuticals industry, for example, thousands of
compounds are often tried before a successful one is uncovered. J. LOWE & N.
CRAWFORD, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR GROWING FIRMS 37(1984).
4Note that the term "work" or "not work" is an oversimplification. This issueis one of degree. The standards of performance, operating conditions, and cost
associated with a product are factors which must be considered. Important also
is the extent to which the innovation will satisfy the relevant technical criteria
without increased cost of development, production, or operation. C. FREEMAN,
supra note 34, at 149.
" F. BUTTRELL supra note 39 and accompanying text.
10 J. LowE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 37. Lowe and Crawford indicatethat as many as ninety-one percent (91%) of new product ideas are technically
[Vol. 37:4
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These factors have fostered the growth of technology licensing as a
means of promoting business development and company growth.51 Tech-
nology licensing is particularly attractive as a mechanism for growth
because it allows two sources of resources to be tapped by providing a
means by which those with technical superiority and those who have
intimate market knowledge can join forces. License agreements often are
used to transfer a wide variety of intellectual property, including patents,
copyrights, trade secrets, and know-how.52 License agreements are not
generally standardized, and a particular transaction is the product of the
circumstances of the licensor, the licensee, and other interested parties.53
The various facts and circumstances which surround a particular license
agreement can play an important role in shaping the agreement. Thus,
it has been recognized that
[1]icense agreements vary widely both in scope and scale how-
ever, and can comprise no more than the use of a particular
patent or agreement in a process in some cases. At the other
end of the spectrum, licensing agreements for industrial proc-
esses can involve the transfer of hundreds of patents, the train-
ing of large numbers of personnel, and large scale investment.5
In complex transactions, a license agreement can be described as a part-
nership which governs the working relationship between the licensor and
licensee. 55 Although the obligations of the parties can be expected to vary
successful, although the study did not consider commercial success. This high-
lights the fact that commercial forces can play an important role in shaping the
success of an idea that can be considered technically successful. Note, however,
that statistics which attempt to highlight the failure rate of attempted innovations
should be approached with caution. These generalizations are usually based on
the experience of a small number of firms over a particular period of time. The
relevance of the figures is directly related to the stage of innovation at which the
measurements are made. The higher failure rates generally refer to determina-
tions made before significant expenditures have been expended on commercial-
ization, and well before commercial launch. C. FREEMAN, supra note 34, at 148.
51 J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 1.
52 See ARNOLD, WHITE, & DURKEE, 1988 LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK 23-43
(1988). See also J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 42.
13 S. REP. No. 505, supra note 8, at 9 (1988).
J, j. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 2. See generally T. Hemnes,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary regarding S. 1626 (June 10, 1988) (Hemnes
discusses license agreements typical of those used in distribution agreements and
in the computer software industry. He emphasizes that typical license agreements
can provide for significant interaction between the parties. Cross-licensing, by
which the parties exchange technology in both directions, is common. Terms which
provide for technical support and training are also common). For an example of
a less complex license agreement dealing with a single patent, see generally
Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
55 J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 2. Note that the license agreement
can be one of several agreements which describes the working relationship be-
tween the parties. S. REP. No. 505, supra note 8, at 9.
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with the scope and terms of the agreement, the licensor and licensee can
be defined in general terms. The licensor will typically agree to transfer
to a purchaser (the licensee) the rights to use intellectual property which
is otherwise protected and will typically provide the licensee with infor-
mation sufficient to use the product or process.56 The emphasis in a tech-
nology license agreement is on the successful commercial application of
the technology. To this end, the licensor has a vested interest in supplying
information and knowledge sufficient to ensure the successful application
of the technology. In return, the licensee often pays a fee which includes
both up front and royalty payments. 57 In many cases, however, the agree-
ment takes the form of a cross licensing agreement in which the cross
transfer of technology accounts for some or all of the consideration. The
licensee normally contracts to use the licensed technology in such a way
as to benefit both parties. This generally requires that the licensee agree
to use a reasonable effort to develop business based on the license.5
Technology licensing can be used to promote the different business
needs of the parties in such a way as to benefit the parties as well as
society in general. 59 These benefits accrue in a number of ways. Reasons
for granting licenses include allowing for growth without sacrificing own-
ership of intellectual property or overextending a firm's management,
the exploitation of alternative markets, the realization of royalty income,
and the reduction of risk.60 A similar set of concerns governs the accept-
ance of licenses. A licensee can, through the licensing process, grow de-
spite income, expertise, and time constraints by adding new products,
improving existing ones, improving production efficiency, and reducing
the risk, time, and expense associated with full scale research and de-
velopment projects.6 1 In effect, the licensee and licensor act as partners
to exploit the market on the premise that both firms can gain substantial
growth at a lower cost than they would be able to if each acted inde-
pendently.62 The risks to both parties are therefore reduced, while the
total returns are likely to be higher than if the parties had acted sepa-
rately.6
3
16 J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 2.
57 Id. See C. FREEMAN, supra note 34, at 4 for a discussion of the importance
of the production and dissemination of knowledge in the investment process.
J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 3.
19 McLaughlin, supra note 38, at 3.
10 See generally B. MAJUMDAR, supra note 34; E. LOVELL, DOMESTIC LICENSING
PRACTICES, A SURVEY (1968) (presenting a survey of 165 senior executives of a
cross section of U.S. firms concerning the motivations, methods, advantages, pit-
falls, and impact of licensing in the operation of their organizations); Paglia,
Basic Considerations in Licensing from the Business Perspective, in Technology
Licensing 1987, at 99 (1987).
61 See generally B. MAJUMDAR, supra note 34; E. LOVELL, supra note 60.
62 J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 3.
Id. Although the potential risks are reduced, it is also true that each party's
share of the total return will be reduced. See S. BERG, J. DUNCAN, & P. FRIEDMAN,
JOINT VENTURE STRATEGIES AND CORPORATE INNOVATION 10-11 (1982); ARNOLD,
wHTE, DURKEE, supra note 52, at 16. A firm's licensing decision is generally made
in this risk-rate of return context. J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 44.
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The benefits which accrue to a licensor can be significant. Although
financial constraints are clearly an important restriction on the activities
of a smaller firm, some have argued that constraints in terms of man-
agement's time are even more significant.6 4 The outward licensing process
allows limited management resources to be focused on the firm's more
pressing, core functions.65 The granting of non-exclusive licenses based
on market segments presents an opportunity to expand innovative prod-
ucts or functions to new areas of application. Thus, an innovator who has
identified more than one area in which his invention may be applied can
seek partners in each area without risking the probability that one de-
veloper's narrow focus will deny him the benefits of development in an-
other area.6 6 This is especially true where a firm's research has led to
ideas which are not immediately appropriate to its own product lines,
where the new technology provides for "spin offs" only tangentially re-
lated to the company's focus, or where a company's manufacturing facil-
ities are insufficient to meet demand.67License agreements based on
geographical area likewise present a mechanism by which an innovation
can be applied or distributed in geographical areas which the innovator
would find it difficult to service.6 8 Licensing also allows small startup
companies to generate revenues to fund their research, testing, and cap-
ital equipment acquisition activities while still maintaining ownership
of the company's intellectual property which, in the case of a high tech-
nology startup company, is often its most significant asset.69 In this way,
a small start up has a better chance to attract the additional capital
needed for continued growth.70 The risk associated with a new product
- J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 1.
6 The transaction costs inherent in entering into and monitoring the license
agreement must be considered, however. S. BERG, J. DUNCAN, & P. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 63, at 10-11. This is especially true of firms with little experience in
identifying potential licensees and undertaking license agreements. J. LOWE &
N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 45. Thus, the need for in-house personnel ex-
perienced in licensing issues or the use of an attorney is often recognized. G.
FREEDMAN, THE PURSUIT OF INNOVATION 311 (1988).
- S. REP. No. 505, supra note 8, at 3.
67 J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47 at 45, 171; E. LOVELL, supra note
60, at 12, 13;
8 Hearings on S. 1626 Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative
Practice of the Senate Judiciary Committee, (June 10, 1988) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of S. Mendell, Chairman of the Board and CEO, Xoma Corp.). See also
ARNOLD, WHITE, & DURKEE, supra note 52, at 13. For a discussion of the consid-
eration influencing licensing decisions in the international arena, see generally
Richards, Licensing in the International Field, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN TECHNOL-
OGY LICENSING 1984, at 189 (1984).
69 Hearings, supra note 68, at 2. See, e.g., In Re Logical Software, 66 Bankr.
683, 684 (D. Mass. 1986).
70 J. McLaughlin, supra note 38, at 3. Most new, high technology companies
finance their operations through revenues obtained by a combination of licensing
and equity capital. These revenues are used to fund the company's research and
development activities and to acquire laboratory equipment, computers, manu-
facturing facilities, and other capital equipment. Id. For a discussion of venture
capital and other methods of providing funding for innovative ventures, see gen-
erally G. YOUNG, VENTURE CAPITAL IN HIGH-TECH COMPANIES (1985) (discussing
the role of venture capital in the electronics industry); R. HISRICH, ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP, INTRAPRENEURSHIP, AND VENTURE CAPITAL (1986) (discussing the role
of venture capital in stimulating economic development and the growth of new
firms).
1989]
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
introduction can also be reduced. For example, it is often difficult to
establish the exact value of an idea before it is introduced to the mar-
ketplace.71 Through licenses, the new ideas can be incorporated into a
product and the financial risk shared between the licensor and licensee.
If the product is unsuccessful, the licensee absorbs the loss of manufac-
turing costs but is not required to pay for an idea that was not successful,
while the licensor receives a share of the benefits realized through a
successful innovation.72 Thus, prudent licensing allows the owner of in-
tellectual property to develop its technology efficiently and in a way that
maximizes its commercial potential.73
A similar set of benefits can accrue to a successful licensee. In general,
license agreements provide a means by which a licensee can grow despite
income and time constraints.7 4 Like the licensor, the licensee can use the
license as a basis for the generation of new products, improvements in
existing products, or for entry into new markets.7 6 License agreements
can also be used to reduce the licensee's investment in the time and
expense of an R&D project. The time element is especially important
where product life cycles are short and rapid entry into the market is a
necessary component of successful commercialization. 76 The risk of an
unsuccessful R&D venture can also be reduced by gaining access to tech-
nology which has already been tested and, in some cases, proven to be
commercially successful. The licensing process can minimize both tech-
nical and financial risk by licensing an established process rather than
relying on the company's own engineering staff to develop a competitive
technology.77 The larger the investment at stake, the greater the incentive
there is to adopt a proven technology.78 An increase in production effi-
ciency through the use of improved production or processing technology
is another benefit which can be obtained through a license agreement.79
These benefits make the licensing of intellectual property an attractive
means of acquiring new products and processes.
71 Hearings, supra note 68 (statement of J. Pickitt, President of the Computer
and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association).72 Hearings, supra note 68, at 3 (statement of J. Pickitt).
71 Hearings, supra note 68, at 3.
?4 J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 1. See also E. LOVELL, supra note
60, at 16.
75 See J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 44; E. LOVELL, supra note
60, at 18.
76 J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 44. See also E. LOVELL, supra
note 60, at 20.
7 This is especially true where experienced and proven research people in a
given area are difficult to come by. ARNOLD, WHITE, & DURKEE, supra note 52, at
22. J. LOWE & N. CRAWFORD, supra note 47, at 44.; E. LOVELL, supra note 60, at
21.7 E. LOVELL, supra note 60, at 21. Note that the goal of a development effort
is to generate the most efficient means of accomplishing a particular function. A
previous, successful development effort may have obtained intellectual property
protection for a given technical approach. Thus, in the absence of a license agree-
ment, a promising technical approach may be foreclosed. See ARNOLD, WHrITE, &
DURKEE, supra note 52, at 21.
19 See, e.g., Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043 (4th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986), in which Lubrizol Enterprises
entered into a licensing agreement concerning the use of a metal finishing process
which had been patented by Richmond.
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IV. REJECTION OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 365
The rejection of executory contracts is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 365.80
Two areas of litigation under § 365 have proven particularly troublesome,
especially when considered in the context of intellectual property license
agreements. The definition of an executory contract is an area of some
uncertainty. Additionally, a unified principle for determining the circum-
stances under which the court will approve a trustee's rejection of an
executory contract has frequently proven to be a matter of contention. 81
The term 'executory contract' is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.
This omission was intentional, and is a result of congressional concern
that because a precise definition of the term is difficult, "any succinct
statutory language risks an unintended omission or inclusion. '82 The
legislative history, however, suggests that an executory contract is one
in which performance of the contract remains due to some extent on both
sides.83 Many courts have interpreted the legislative history to indicate
an implicit congressional acceptance of the definition proffered by Pro-
fessor Countryman, who defines an executory contract as "a contract
under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to
the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the perfor-
mance of the other.18 4 Countryman's analysis concluded that the require-
ment of continuing obligations by both sides was a fundamental
component of an executory contract in the bankruptcy context. Country-
man also recognized that the "usual patent license, by which the patentee-
licensor authorizes the licensee to exercise some part of the patentee's
exclusive right to make, use and vend the patented item in return for
80 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
"11 U.S.C. § 365(a) provide that "the trustee, subject to the court's approval,
may assume or reject any contract ...." 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988). The Bankruptcy
Code does not contain provisions to guide the courts in determining those situ-
ations in which approval is appropriate. The judicial resolution of this issue is
addressed infra notes 99-127 and accompanying text.
12 Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc No. 137 part I, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1973).
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977). Some courts have ex-
plicitly adopted this definition, standing along, to determine whether a contract
is in fact executory. See, e.g., In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument, 35 Bankr. 561 (W.D.
Wash. 1983).
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv.
439, 460 (1973). These courts tend to view the Countryman test as merely a more
precise embodiment of the Congressional intent. See, e.g., Lubrizol Enter. v. Rich-
mond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986);
Fenix v. Silver (Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290, 293 (1980); Chipwich, 54
Bankr. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Midwest Polychem, 61 Bankr. 559 (N.D. Ill.
1986); In re Waldron, 36 Bankr. 633 (S.D. Fla. 1984), In re Knutson, 563 F.2d
916 (8th Cir. 1977). Although the Countryman definition speaks primarily to two
party contracts, Countryman stated that his analysis applied equally to multi-
party contracts as long as the" 'other party to the contract' is limited to one from
whom some performance is owing to the bankrupt. For example, if A, B, and C
enter into a single contract in which A and B agree to sell a quantity of goods to
C and at C's bankruptcy A has performed and B has not, the contract is executory
as to B, but not as to A." Countryman, supra, at 460, n. 86.
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payment of royalties, ordinarily takes the form of an executory contract."85
The Countryman view has gained wide acceptance and is often applied
to patent and other intellectual property licenses. Hence, intellectual
property license agreements are generally found to be executory. For
example, Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers86 presents a
contract in which Richmond, prior to its bankruptcy, granted Lubrizol a
license to use a patented industrial process. The contract was found to
be executory under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) in light of the court's determination
that continuing performance by both parties was required and that failure
of either party to perform these obligations would constitute a material
breach of the contract.87 Richmond had several ongoing duties under the
terms of the agreement. Most importantly, Richmond owed Lubrizol the
continuing duty of notifying Lubrizol of further licensing of the process
and of reducing Lubrizol's royalty rate commensurate with more favor-
able licenses granted to others.n Richmond was also under an ongoing
duty to notify Lubrizol of patent infringement suits as well as to defend
these suits and to indemnify Lubrizol for losses arising out of misrepre-
sentation or breach of warranty by Richmond. 89 Lubrizol, the licensor,
was under an ongoing obligation to account for and pay royalties over
the life of the agreement.90
A similar contract which governed an exclusive computer software
license was held to be executory in Fenix Cattle Company v. Silver (In re
Select-A-Seat Corp.).9 1 The court found that due to the exclusive nature
of the agreement, Fenix, the debtor-licensor, was under a continuing
obligation not to sell its software packages to other parties.9 2 The court
stated that violation of this obligation would constitute a material breach
of the agreement. 93 The licensee's duty to make royalty payments was
held to make the agreement executory from the perspective of the licensee
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV.
439, 501 (1973).756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
871 Id. at 1045.
Id. This type of agreement is common in license agreements and is often
referred to as a "Most Favored Nation" or "Most Favored Licensee" clause. See
Cascio, Key Provisions for Technology Licensing Agreements, TECHNOLOGY Li-
CENSING 1987 at 159, 161 (1987); Kline, Key License Clauses, TECHNOLOGY Li-
CENSING 1987 at 175, 177 (1987).
11 Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
o Id. at 1046. Where all elements of performance have been completed, leaving
only an obligation for the payment of money, a contract is not executory. In the
Matter of Smith Jones, Inc., 26 Bankr. 289, 292 (D. Minn. 1982); Lubrizol Enter.
v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1057 (1986). Thus, the court carefully distinguished noted Lubrizol's
duties to provide written quarterly sales reports and to make the data available
to an independent auditor. The court found that Lubrizol's promise went beyond
a "mere debt, or promise to pay money", and was found to be executory. Lubrizol
Enter., 756 F.2d at 1045-46.
"' 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980).92 Id. at 292.
93 Id.
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in light of the court's finding that failure to perform this obligation 
would
constitute a material breach.
94
Although commonly applied, the Countryman test has not escaped 
crit-
icism. A central objection is related to the need to address the policy
considerations inherent in a decision as to whether a contract is executory.
A rigid adherence to the Countryman test obscures these considerations.
In discussing this issue, the Sixth Circuit noted that definitions such 
as
the Countryman test
are helpful, but do not resolve this problem. The key, it seems,
to deciphering the meaning of the executory contract rejection
provisions, is to work backward, proceeding from an exami-
nation of the purposes rejection is expected to accomplish. If
those objectives have already been accomplished, or if they
can't be accomplished through rejection, then the contract is
not executory within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.
9 5
This position can be criticized due to the open-ended 
nature of its inquiry.
9 6
Judge Mabey, a proponent of this approach, counters by emphasizing 
that
executory contracts are not characterized by "a mutuality of commit-
ments, but by the nature of the parties and the goals 
of reorganization. 9 7
The role of rejection in enlarging the value of the estate and furthering
the creditor become the focus of the judicial inquiry.
9 8
A second area of significant controversy is the circumstances in which
a court will approve the rejection of a contract which has been found to
be executory. This problem is generally attacked using one of two 
ap-
proaches. The first approach considers whether rejection is in the best
interest of the estate as viewed in the business judgment of the trustee.
The second approach proceeds by balancing the effects of rejection on both
the debtor's estate and the contracting party. This area of controversy 
is,
in the final analysis, the issue that led to the passage of the Intellectual
Property Bankruptcy Protection Act.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, rejection of an executory contract
was denied unless the contract was shown to be "onerous" 
or "burden-
94 Id. The licensee's argument that the contract was no longer executory be-
cause it had paid an initial $140,000 for the license rights was rejected by the
court. In an analysis paralleling that of the Lubrizol court, the court 
emphasized
the ongoing duty of the licensee to pay a royalty fee based on a percentage 
of the
net return from the use of the licensed software.
In re Jolly, 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1978).
.This criticism was noted, but dismissed, in In re Waldron, 36 Bankr. 633,
639 (S.D. Fla. 1984). The court noted that although the approach could be criticized
for being result oriented, result orientation is endemic to the policy choices which
must be made in determining whether a contract is executory and rejectable
under § 365. The court went on to state that the Countryman test is equally
result oriented.
97 In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 56 (D. Utah 1982).
08 See, e.g., In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 58-61 (D. Utah 1982). In In re Oxford
Royal Mushroom Products, 45 Bankr. 792 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) the court held
that an executory contract is one where there remained substantial performance
by either party to the agreement.
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some" to the estate.99 The onerous or burdensome test has fallen into
disfavor, however:
[T]he concept of rejection of executory contracts had its roots
in the principle that the trustee might abandon burdensome
property. From this has grown one view that for the trustee to
reject an executory contract, the contract must in fact be bur-
densome, i.e., involve some loss or detriment to the estate.
What, however of the situation where the contract, while prof-
itable or generally beneficial, could be, if rejected, replaced by
a more attractive arrangement?1°°
Since a primary purpose of the power to reject is to enlarge the estate of
the debtor, there is little difference between a contract which consumes
resources and is therefore burdensome and one which does not reflect the
full value of an asset.10' In each case, the value of the estate is depressed,
and the creditors receive a reduced payment. A related concern is that
the burdensome test could "work a substantial injustice in cases where
it can be shown that the non-debtor contracting party will reap substan-
tial benefits under the contract while the debtor's creditors are forced to
make substantial compromises of their claims."'0 2
The onerous and burdensome test has been supplanted by the "business
judgment test", which focuses instead on the judgment of the trustee that
the rejection of the contract will benefit the estate. 13 The leading case in
this area is Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul Pacific Railway Co., 0 4 where the Supreme Court first articulated
the business judgment standard. The business judgment standard has
been followed by a number of recent cases, although there is considerable
uncertainty as to whether the harm to the other contracting party should
be considered as part of the court's rejection decision.
Several recent cases have considered the rejection decision in light of
the trustee's business judgment and then proceeded to consider the impact
of rejection on the other contracting party. The primary focus, however,
has been the impact of rejection on general unsecured creditors. The
interests of the other contracting party receive significantly less consid-
eration.
For example, in In re Huang,'0 5 the court considered a fact situation in
which the debtor wished to reject an executory contract for the sale of
real property. The court stated that "[tihe primary issue is whether the
99 See generally Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts, 31 U. CHI. L. REV.
467, 468-72 (1964).
100 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.), Para 365.03 (356-18).
"I Krasnwiecki, The Impact of the New Bankruptcy Reform Act on Real Estate
Development and Financing, 53 AM.BANKR.L.J. 363, 382 (1979).
102 In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 43, (2d Cir. 1979).
103 See, e.g., In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Products, 83 Bankr. 241, 246
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
104 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
15 23 Bankr. 798 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
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rejection would benefit the general unsecured creditors."'16 The court con-
tinued:
[I]t is proper for the court to refuse to authorize rejection of a
lease or executory contract where the party whose contract is
to be rejected would be damaged disproportionately to any ben-
efit to be derived by the general creditors of the estate, as for
example where most of the "benefit" of rejection of the contract
would be captured by a third party at the expense of the un-
secured creditors. This statement does not sanction rejection
of a contract because of a generalized concern that a party
whose contract is rejected will be damaged.t0 7
This approach, although it considers the rights of the other contracting
party, places much greater emphasis on the fact that the benefits of re-
jection will escape the creditors of the estate. The losses which accrued
to the other contracting party in Huang were limited to the anticipated
profit from the appreciation of the real property in question. 0 8 The court
characterized these losses as merely the "disappointment of legitimate
expectations" and allowed rejection of the contract. 0 9
A similar approach was used in In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co.,""
where the court considered the rejection of an executory contract which
granted an exclusive license to build and sell the inventions of the
debtor."' The licensee's business was based solely on the distribution of
the debtor's product and had been operating at a substantial profit. The
Petur court, while citing the Huang decision with approval, distinguished
the fact pattern before it by stating that the rejection of the license agree-
ment would result in the destruction of the licensee's business. 1 2 The
court found that the harm to the licensee was more than the mere dis-
appointment of legitimate expectations and characterized the conse-
quences of rejection as the "ruination of an otherwise profitable, successful
and ongoing business.' ' 3
"'Id. at 801.
107 Id.
108 Id.
"'In re Huang, 23 Bankr. 798, 801 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
11035 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
It is interesting to note the treatment given to the business judgment of the
trustee. The court purported to accept the judgment of the debtor that its best
interests and the best interests of the creditors would be served by rejection based
on the debtor's belief that that the licensing arrangement prevented the debtor
from fully realizing the profits available from the Canadian market. Later in the
opinion, however, the court disputes this finding in stating that the "profits that
the debtor envisions are only projections based on little, if any experience in the
Canadian market" and that the licensee had "been effective in retailing in the
Canadian market." The court concluded that the evidence did not show that the
licensee would be unlikely to continue this performance or that the debtor would
be able to do better. Id. at 564.
11 Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
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As we have seen, Huang"', Petur1 5, and similar cases1 6 have applied
the business judgment test and have indicated at least some willingness
to consider the concerns of the party faced with rejection of the contract
in cases where substantial harm to that party's business is likely to result.
A second line of cases, while accepting the business judgment test, has
declined to consider the impact of rejection on the licensee. It is this line
of cases which generated intense concern in the intellectual property
licensing community and substantial support from the business com-
munity for the amendment of 11 U.S.C. § 365.117
The decision in Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers""
became the focal point of these concerns. As noted previously, Lubrizol
concerned a debtor's successful attempt to reject an agreement which
granted Lubrizol a non-exclusive license to use a patent owned by the
debtor."9 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a lower court
ruling 20 which stated that rejection of the agreement would not deprive
Lubrizol of the intellectual property rights acquired under the agree-
ment.1 2 ' As interpreted by the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol, 11 U.S.C. § 365
entitled Lubrizol to "treat rejection as a breach and seek a money damages
remedy; however, it could not seek to retain its contract rights in the
technology by specific performance" although specific performance would
normally be an available option upon breach of this type of contract. 22
Thus, Lubrizol was stripped of its rights to the licensed technology. The
court noted the policy considerations inherent in its decision, but held
that its decision was required under 11 U.S.C. § 365 even though the
decision would impose serious burdens on contracting parties such as
Lubrizol:
[IR]ejection in this and comparable cases could have a general
chilling effect upon the willingness of such parties to contract
at all with businesses in possible financial difficulty. But under
bankruptcy law such equitable considerations may not be in-
dulged by courts in respect of the type of contract here in issue.
114 23 Bankr. 798 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
115 35 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
"I E.g. Matter of Smith Jones, Inc., 26 Bankr. 289 (D. Minn. 1982), where the
court explicitly conducted a "balancing of the relative benefits and detriments
both to the debtor and to the other affected party" after determining that the
debtor's continuing obligations were both "burdensome" and that requesting re-
jection was a "proper exercise of business judgment." Id. at 293,4.
- See generally, Agres, Bankruptcy Law Loophole Worries New Firms, The
Scientist, Aug. 8, 1988, at 3 col. 2; Fanning, Invisible Property, Forbes, March
23, 1987, at 104.; Hearings on S. 1626, supra note 71.
11 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
"I See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
120 In re Richmond Metal Finishers, 38 Bankr. 341 (E.D. Va. 1984).
" Id. at 344.
112 Lubrizol Enter., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). The court read 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)
to provide a damages only remedy for the non-bankrupt party. At the same time,
the court held that allowing specific performance would undercut the purpose of
rejection under § 11 U.S.C. 365(a). Id.
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Congress has plainly provided for the rejection of executory
contracts, notwithstanding the obvious adverse consequences
for contracting parties thereby made inevitable.
123
A similar analysis resulted in a similar outcome in In re Chipwich,1
2 4
where the debtor was allowed to reject executory contracts granting li-
censes to produce and sell dairy products under the debtor's trademark.
12
Since the rejection of the executory contracts would be advantageous to
the debtor, the court allowed rejection while noting that rejection would
deprive the licensee of its right to use the debtor's trademark.
126 The
court, citing Lubrizol and noting the likely chilling effect of its decision,
also contrasted the factual situation before it from that in Petur by stating
that the damage to the licensee was not disproportionate to the benefit
of the creditors in light of the fact that the license was not the foundation
of the licensee's business.
127
V. THE IMPACT OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BANKRUPTCY
PROTECTION
ACT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE AGREEMENTS
The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act was enacted
largely in response to concerns raised by the Lubrizol decision and its
progeny. As discussed previously, the primary purpose of the Act is to
promote intellectual property licensing by providing certainty as to the
licensee's right to the continued use of the licensed property in the event
of the licensor's bankruptcy. 2 The Act pursues this objective by allowing
the licensee to elect to retain its rights to the licensed property as they
existed at the commencement of the bankruptcy action.
The agreement in Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers"
9
typifies a straightforward license agreement which is within the intended
reach of the Act. The agreement provided that Lubrizol would receive a
non-exclusive license to utilize a patented metal coating process developed
by Richmond Metal Finishers [Richmond] in return for royalty pay-
ments. 30 The agreement contained other provisions which imposed on-
going obligations on both parties. Lubrizol was required to account for
and pay royalties for use of the process. Richmond was required to notify
Lubrizol of any patent infringement suit and to defend in any such suit,
to extend to Lubrizol most favored licensee status, and to indemnify Lu-
brizol for losses arising out of any misrepresentation or breach of war-
ranty.'3' The contract also provided that Lubrizol was not to utilize the
123 Id.
12 54 Bankr. 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
"I Id. at 428.
1. Id. at 431.
" 7 Id. at 431.
128 See supra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text.
129 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
130 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
131 Id.
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licensed technology for a period of nine months after the agreement was
signed.132
Under the Act, rejection by Richmond would leave Lubrizol with two
options. First, Lubrizol could treat the rejection as terminating the con-
tract under 11 U.S.C § 365(n)(1)(A). By accepting rejection, Lubrizol
would be stripped of its rights to the licensed process as embodied in the
rejected agreement. Richmond would be relieved of its ongoing duties
under the agreement, and would be free to negotiate other agreements
concerning the underlying technology unencumbered by the agreement
with Lubrizol.13 3 Lubrizol's second option would be to elect under 11 U.S.C.
§ 365 (n)(1)(B) to retain its rights to the intellectual property as they
existed immediately prior to the commencement of Richmond's bank-
ruptcy case. Lubrizol could then continue to utilize the licensed technology
for the duration of the agreement and for any period for which it could
extend the license as of right. 34 In addition, Lubrizol would be required
to make all royalty payments due under the contract for the duration of
the contract or any extensions as of right. 135 The Act would also require
that Lubrizol waive its rights to setoff of damages and any claims for
allowance of administrative expenses, although Lubrizol would still re-
tain a general claim for damages as a breach of contract under 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(g). 136 Although Lubrizol would be unable to seek specific perfor-
mance of other contractual obligations under the agreement, Richmond
or its trustee would be required to allow Lubrizol to exercise its rights
to the licensed technology and to provide it with the intellectual property
and any embodiments to which it was entitled under the agreement. 3 7
Hence, Lubrizol would not be entitled to seek specific performance of
Richmond's duty to defend patent infringement suits.
The Act is successful, when considered in the context of the Lubrizol
decision, in addressing the negative aspects of rejection while addressing
the needs of the bankrupt's estate. Of foremost importance is the fact the
contracting party has an option to retain the bargained for technology.
This option addresses the root of the concerns, which surfaced after Lu-
brizol, that rejection by the licensor would deprive the licensee of an
essential component of its product or process.13 Under the Act, the li-
censee who has based at least some portion of its business on an intel-
lectual property license is protected from the immediate loss of that
license. The licensee therefore has a breathing space equal to the duration
of the agreement in which to find a substitute for the intellectual property
covered by the license.
112 Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
113 This provision is the statutory equivalent of the judicial decision in the
Lubrizol case.
'3 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (1988).
'35 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B) (1988).
"16 H.R. REP. No. 1012, supra note 7, at 9.
137 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(A), (n)(3).
13 See generally Hearings, supra note 68; J. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 38.
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Although the Act provides significant protection to the licensee, limi-
tations on the duties of the bankrupt under rejection, which function to
protect the bankrupt and its estate by shielding the bankrupt from specific
performance, are retained. One obligation common to intellectual prop-
erty licenses is the licensor's duty to defend patent infringement suits."39
Although rejection would excuse the licensor from defending an infringe-
ment suit, the licensee could enter a general, unsecured claim against
the estate for the cost of its defense in the suit under 11 U.S.C. § 502(g).
The licensee would also lose the benefit of royalty reductions based on
most favored licensee status, although an unsecured claim for damages
is not precluded. 40 Thus, as applied to a straightforward patent license
such as the one encountered in Lubrizol, the Act achieves its objective.
It provides the licensee with continued access to the licensed technology
while relieving the debtor of the duty of ongoing performance.
A somewhat different scenario is presented by the facts of In re Petur
U.S.A. Instrument, Co.. 4 The debtor-licensor, Petur U.S.A. Instrument,
had invented a line of scientific instruments and had received patent
protection for its inventions. 42 The non-debtor party, Petur of Canada,
was a company formed solely for the purpose of marketing the debtor's
products. 143 The parties entered into a twenty year license agreement
which provided Petur of Canada with the exclusive right to use, manu-
facture, assemble, and sell the inventions and related components in
Canada.1 44 Petur U.S.A. agreed to provide the necessary expertise and
know-how and also agreed to perform sixteen hours per month of con-
sulting services. In return, Petur of Canada paid a fixed fee and agreed
to pay royalties based on a percentage of gross sales. 45
Recall that the Petur court denied the debtor's motion to reject the
agreement because rejection would result in the destruction of the non-
debtor's business. 146 In addition to retaining its rights to manufacture,
assemble, and sell the licensed inventions, Petur of Canada also retained
its right to the licensor's know-how and the bargained for consulting
services. The court's refusal to allow rejection afforded the licensee with
the maximum protection it could receive under the agreement-the li-
cense agreement remained in effect, and both parties continued to be
139 The expense of defending these suits can often be significant. Fees for at-
torneys and expert witnesses, in addition to court costs, can be expected to total
between $250,000 and $1.5 million. The expense of such a suit could consume
the debtor's entire estate. T. Hemnes, supra note 54, at 4.
14 This situation applies only to non-exlusive license agreements. Recall that
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) specifically allows a licensee to "enforce any exclusivity
provisions" if the licensor elects to retain its rights under the license.
,4,35 Bankr. 561 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
142 Id. at 561-62.
14 Id. at 562.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text. The court implicitly re-
jected the Lubrizol court's view that the effect of the rejection should not be
considered due to the explicit statutory language embodied in 11 U.S.C. § 365
prior to passage of the Act.
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bound by its terms. At the same time, the estate of the bankrupt received
minimal protection. The bankrupt was unable to reject the executory
license agreement and was thus prevented from obtaining the benefit of
more favorable license terms which, in its business judgment, could be
obtained if it were free to negotiate with other potential licensees. At the
same time, the licensor was required to continue providing consulting
services under the agreement.
If the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act had been in
effect at the time of the Petur decision, the rights and obligations of the
parties would have been significantly altered. As we have seen, the Act
allows the bankrupt party to reject the contract subject to the licensee's
right to retain its rights to the licensed technology. 147 In the Petur case,
where the contract was found to be executory and where rejection was
arguably within the sound business judgment of the trustee, rejection
would be permitted under the Act. Assuming that Petur of Canada would
elect to retain its rights as provided by the Act,'148 it would be entitled to
the rights to the intellectual property as they existed immediately prior
to the commencement of the debtor's bankruptcy case.14 9 Petur of Canada
would thus retain its exclusive right to use, manufacture, assemble, and
sell the invention in Canada. Rejection by Petur U.S.A. would then pre-
vent Petur of Canada from seeking specific performance of the obligations
remaining under the agreement. Most significantly, the Petur of Canada
(the licensee) would be unable to obtain specific performance of the li-
censor's consulting services.150 These services are largely inseparable from
the technology which is the subject of the license agreement, and are
important even as applied to the technology as it existed at the time the
parties entered into the agreement. 51 They are easily distinguished from
147 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1988). The Act would seem to prevent the court from
denying a debtor's motion to reject in cases where the court is concerned that
rejection could result in a disproportionate damage to the non-debtor party. Al-
though a debtor's motion to reject remains subject to the court's approval under
11 U.S.C. § 365(a), the Act is based on an explicit Congressional consideration
of the policy objectives underlying the rejection of intellectual property license
agreements. In light of this Congressional assessment, the provisions of the Act
are intended to provide the proper degree of protection to parties involved.148 11 U.S.C. 365(n)(1)(13).
149 The Senate states that the licensee under the rejected license "is entitled
to use the underlying intellectual property in the state that it existed on the day
of the bankruptcy filing as provided in the license." S. REP. No. 505, supra note
8, at 9.
150 This result is consistent with the congressional intent:
The debtor/trustee will essentially have no obligation to the licensee
after rejection other than to turn over existing technology and permit
the licensee to use the technology. Obligations such as that to provide
the licensee with continued training in the use of the technology or
with updates of the technology will be terminated.
H. R. REP. No. 1012, supra note 7, at 7.
15 The bargained for consulting services are extremely important because the
inventor is in a superior position to facilitate the manufacture, application, and
installation of the invention. It is not uncommon, for example, to encounter un-
anticipated difficulties in the manufacture of a product. The inventor, with his
superior knowledge of the principles which govern the operation of the invention,
is more likely to successfully pinpoint the cause of these difficulties and to identify
suitable corrective action. The inventor is also in a superior position with regard
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the obligation to defend patent infringement actions and the obligation
to modify royalty rates based on subsequent license agreements. When
viewed from a business perspective, these obligations, as contrasted to
the inventor's ongoing consulting duties, do not relate directly to the
application of the licensed intellectual property, and are at worst spec-
ulative.
Without the expertise of the inventor, the licensee's ability to com-
mercialize the invention successfully could be significantly impaired be-
cause the inventor, with his intimate knowledge of the licensed
technology, is in a much better position to recognize and correct for un-
foreseen difficulties encountered in its application. The fact that the par-
ties included consulting services in the license agreement supports the
view that the parties recognized the inventor's superior position.
At the same time, Petur would be required to "make all royalty pay-
ments due" under the contract.1 5 2 The Act provides that the licensee, in
electing to retain the licensed technology, waives "any right of setoff it
may have" under the contract as well as administrative claims otherwise
allowable under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).1 53 Thus, Petur of Canada would be
unable to subtract from the royalty payments for damages resulting from
Petur U.S.A.'s non-performance of its consulting obligations. It could,
however, assert a claim against the estate for damages caused by the
rejection as a breach of contract under § 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. 1 5
4
This would allow Petur of Canada to present a claim for the damages
to solving problems related to the application of the product under varying con-
ditions and for unusual or unanticipated purposes. Hence, consulting services can
be an extremely important component of an intellectual property license agree-
ment.
The inventor's consulting duties assume a much greater role where the parties
contemplate that the license technology may require modification as part of the
commercialization process. In this situation, the inventor's expertise becomes even
more important because familiarity with the underlying technological principles
is prerequisite to the successful implementation of modification. This expertise
is often not easily acquired. Recall that this lack of expertise is a factor which
tends to make licensing an attractive option in the first place. See supra notes
33-78 and accompanying text; See also G. FREEDMAN, supra note 64, at 316.
112 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B) (1988). Performance due by the licensee can extend
beyond royalty payments, especially in cases where some or all of the consider-
ation is provided by the licensee is in the form of related licenses extended to the
debtor. A licensee who elects to retain its technology rights under a rejected
contract is bound by his other obligations or duties under the contract, "except
for those so directly related to obligations or duties that the licensor has been
freed from by rejection as to make it inequitable to bind the licensee to them."
H. R. REP. No. 1012, supra note 7, at 7.
153 Id. The purpose of this provision is to insure that the debtor-licensor will
continue to receive the income from royalty payments which is often essential to
the debtor's reorganization. G. Hahn, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S.
1626, at 8 (June 10, 1988). In contrast, the right to setoff is explicitly allowed in
cases involving the rejection of unexpired leases of real property as well as ex-
ecutory contracts for the sale of real property. 11 U.S.C. 365(h) and (i) (1988).
114 H.R. REP. No- 1012, supra note 7, at 8.
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resulting from the licensor's non-performance. 155
The Petur fact pattern presents a situation which is somewhat more
complex than the fact pattern in the Lubrizol case. In Lubrizol, the tech-
nology was transferred as it existed under the licensor's patent. The
licensor was not obligated to perform further duties related to the transfer
of the technology itself. Under the agreement, Lubrizol, the licensee,
assumed, at least under the contract, the totality of the efforts necessary
to successfully utilize commercially the licensed technology as it existed
at the time of the contract. The licensor in Petur, on the other hand, was
entitled under the agreement to receive the ongoing benefit of the in-
ventor's expertise in the operation and application of the technology.
VI. CONCLUSION
The licensing of intellectual property is an important means of facili-
tating the commercialization of technology in a cost effective manner.
Recent court decisions which allowed a bankrupt licensor to reject the
terms of an intellectual property license agreement and thereby strip the
licensee of the rights which it had acquired under the rejected agreement
acted as a general disincentive to enter into these license agreements.
The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act is intended to ad-
dress these concerns. The central concern of the licensee, that it retain
access to the licensed technology, has been addressed by the Act. At the
same time, the interests of the debtor and its estate remain protected.
The debtor continues to receive royalty income from the licensed tech-
nology, while it is also relieved of the burden of specific performance.
The Act also imposes costs on both parties. Perhaps most significantly,
the licensee cannot obtain specific performance of the licensor's obliga-
tions related to training and support of the licensed technology, although
it can seek at least partial compensation for these losses via a claim as
a creditor of the estate. In contrast, the licensor is bound to the terms of
the agreement and is precluded from depriving the licensor of access to
the technology in order to enter into a subsequent, potentially more lu-
crative agreement. When viewed in this way, the Intellectual Property
Bankruptcy Protection Act is largely successful in addressing the needs
of both the licensee and the bankrupt licensor without undue disruption
of the policies underlying the rejection of executory contracts.
JOHN J. FRY
15 Note that this claim would be considered as a breach of contract occurring
immediately before the date of the debtor's bankruptcy petition. Petur of Canada
would therefore be treated as a general unsecured creditor. See supra notes 29-
32 and accompanying text. Assuming that the estate is insufficient to cover its
debts, the licensee would receive only some fraction of the actual damages.
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